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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the aftermath of the financial and economic crisis, the implementation of the new 
European economic governance from 2010-2011 has weakened national collective 
bargaining systems. In the French case, the economic crisis did not break the industrial 
relations system but it reinforced changes in employment relations within firms. Indeed, 
workers and their unions’ representative may have agreed upon news rules of labour 
flexibility and of wage policies at firm-level in order to safeguard jobs. This paper aims at 
assessing the roles played by employers and trade unions in concessions bargaining in times 
of crisis among French Firms. It also questions the way union representatives have 
participated in decisions of adjustment and whether they have softened managerial 
strategies. 
From a methodological point of view, we investigate the dynamism of concessions bargaining 
by relying on cross referencing of the REPONSE 2010-2011 survey (provided by French 
Ministry of Labour) on French industrial relations between 2008 and 2010 and of fifteen 
case studies conducted in French establishments (which answered to the REPONSE survey), 
mostly in the manufacturing sector and members of a corporate group. 
Firstly, we analyse the REPONSE 2010-2011 survey in order to draw an overview of the 
context of collective bargaining at firm-level on employment and wages adjustments. We also 
provide descriptive statistics on the main features of establishments according to the 
influence of group headquarters on decisions in terms of employment and wages and on the 
nature of industrial relations. Secondly, case studies are introduced in order to make a 
comprehensive analysis on conditions that favour concessions bargaining. We identify the 
content of collective bargaining in terms of trade-offs and whether these latter are more or 
less reciprocal and reversible. Case studies confirm that employment and wages adjustments 
result often from ‘formal’ collective bargaining since these subjects are legally bound by 
terms of agreement. Nevertheless, in this case, the influence of union representatives on the 
outcomes remains weak. Beyond that, we show the significance and the dynamism of 
‘informal’ collective bargaining, which result from non-binding process of negotiations. More 
precisely, three configurations of concessions bargaining are identified. The first one gathers  
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establishments in which employers and union representative had intensive informal 
discussion on labour flexibility (short- working time, agency contracts, internal mobility 
schemes, etc.). Here union representatives are able to soften managerial decisions in terms 
of adjustment. In the second configuration, collective bargaining lead to irreversible 
concessions, suggesting that crisis seems to be a catalyst of managerial decisions made for 
a long time. The last configuration reveals that managers use adjustments on employment as 
‘blackmail’ while unions representative tend to behave with resignation. 
Finally, the analysis suggests that the economic and financial crisis may have been 
favourable for concessions bargaining among French firms. Concession is obviously intrinsic 
to bargaining process but the outcomes depend on the power relationship between 
employers and trade unions.  
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